The nonprofit Volt Eesti was established in Tartu in late August, supporting center-left and pro-European positions and aiming to become a new political party in Estonia.

"We're rather talking about a liberal orientation, perhaps with a slight center-left tilt on economic issues," Artur Kaasik, a board member of the new nonprofit, told ERR on Monday about the new group's political orientation. "What Estonian politics currently lacks is an innovative center-left party, particularly as, for example, Eesti 200 is disappearing and the other parties do not have much of a vision for Europe to offer," he added.

According to the organization's bylaws, its aim is to support democratic participation, promote pan-European political integration and support progressive social and economic reforms.

Kaasik agreed that such policies would put Volt Eesti in competition with the Social Democratic Party, but also pointed to some differences from the Social Democrats' positions.

"Innovation is important in that sense. We don't think everything necessarily has to be free. Yes, certain basic needs should be guaranteed, but not everything can be free either," he said.

The nonprofit's bylaws also state that its specific organizational goal is to increase the number of full members to at least 500 in order to establish and register an organizationally and legally independent political party in accordance with Estonian law.

Asked how quickly they hope to establish the party, Kaasik said: "As soon as possible, once we have enough people."

According to Kaasik, the nonprofit Volt Eesti currently has around 50 members.

Kaasik declined to name any prominent members, but acknowledged that former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves is among its supporters.

Kaasik said Volt Eesti would also like to take part in the next Riigikogu elections, which will be held on March 7. "Let's put it this way: We'll do our best to make that happen, but I can't promise how likely it is that we'll field candidates," he said.

Asked about the organization's funding, Kaasik said it does not have any specific donor and that anyone interested will soon be able to provide financial support to the organization.

Under its bylaws, Volt Eesti will operate as the official national branch of the pan-European organization Volt Europa and is required to uphold, promote and implement Volt Europa's values and objectives.

Volt Europa says what distinguishes it from other political organizations operating across Europe is that, while those organizations are based on cooperation among parties operating in individual countries, Volt seeks to develop a common European political platform.

In addition to center-left economic policy goals, Volt emphasizes in its policy positions the need to reform the European Union and pursue closer integration than at present.

Volt Europa was founded in 2017 and is registered in Belgium. It currently operates in more than 30 European countries. It has five members in the European Parliament who sit with the Greens/European Free Alliance group.

The name Volt — a unit of electric potential, or voltage, that is the same in all languages — was chosen to symbolize bringing new energy into European politics.

What tensions do you think exist between the EU’s enlargement towards the Eastern Neighbourhood and the EU’s energy security? Does the EU need to change its infrastructure in order to accommodate further enlargement?

I didn't find a strong-branded, young, grounded pro-federalEU social pages that create a sense of EU community. I just found boring think-tank or so pages with a strong political smell that moves generalistic people away but strong EU federalists.

I believe there's the need to create a genZ /Millenial-focused page with a growing community behind that firstly aims at creating a sense of EU belonging.

What do you think? Please, let's be constructive.

If anyone is interested, write me in private.

The federalist papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison to persuade New Yorkers to ratify the constitution. At the time there was a great debate between federalists and anti-federalists (anti-federalist papers are also interesting) on wether or not to give up state powers to a new and stronger union (the USA before the constitution. was under the Articles of Confederation which in many ways was a less integrated union than the current EU). At the time, the US was having the same debate that some are starting to have now in the EU and hopefully will have more and more in the next few years.

Federalist 39 --> What is a federation
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed39.asp

Federalist 23 --> Federal powers and national defense
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed23.asp

Federalist 51 --> Seperation of powers in a federation
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp

Federalist 10 --> A large unit can better manage political factions
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp

Federalist 46 --> States still retain powers
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed46.asp

A family story of exile, return and Europe's renewal - or why despite all what is going on with the nationalist populists wave and the war in Ukraine, Europe is actually on a good path now toward federation.

(no plot spoilers ahead, but I do mention some locations where the show takes place which is why it's tagged as spoiler)

If you haven't seen The Day of the Jackal yet, I highly suggest you do. It's a phenomenal show, and will be getting a second season soon.

That's not what I'm here to talk about however - this show is surprisingly euro-federalist, whether it realizes it or not

I think it's rare that we get media that focuses on all of Europe, and not just one specific country. The Day of the Jackal has scenes in the UK, Spain, France, Germany, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia and more. It treats Europe as one entity instead of 50. It travels between countries smoothly, just like how movies and shows travel between states in the US. It shows great cooperation between nations, instead of portraying them as fragmented and weak. But most importantly: it pushes America aside doesn't care about pleasing American audiences, and I love that.

I personally think we need more media like The Day of the Jackal. Although the author of the book it's based on was a big eurosceptic, this adaptation of his work is some of the most euro-federalist media in modern times (to my knowledge) which is very ironic haha

So yeah, definitely give it a watch if you like spy thrillers/crime dramas!

Let’s step back from the daily rhetoric and examine the raw arithmetic and legal architecture driving Europe’s migration deadlock.

The Scale and the Structural Blind Spot
Africa’s population currently stands at roughly 1.58 billion people and is projected to expand significantly over the coming decades. It is an objective impossibility for Europe—let alone a single frontline state like Italy—to absorb even a fraction of this population.

When instruments like the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were drafted, they were designed in the immediate aftermath of World War II to protect specific, identifiable political dissidents and refugees escaping localized totalitarian regimes in Europe.

They were never engineered to regulate mass, economically driven migration channels facilitated by transnational human-smuggling cartels. Treating mass unauthorized arrivals through an individual case-by-case asylum framework originally meant for Cold War defectors has created a systemic loophole:
It imposes an open-ended, unfunded statutory mandate on nation-states.

Smuggling networks exploit legal protections (non-refoulement, prolonged appeals, detention caps) to create operational paralysis on the ground.
The economic and security burden falls disproportionately on local taxpayers, whose public infrastructure, municipal budgets, and civic services are strained to maintain procedural requirements that yield minimal return rates.

The Reality on the Water: How the Legal Loophole Is Exploited
To understand why the system is broken, consider the operational sequence playing out constantly in the Central Mediterranean:

Premeditated Departure: An individual in a non-war country (Country X) pays a smuggling cartel thousands of euros to board an unseaworthy dinghy or wooden boat, intentionally lacking basic safety gear or fuel to make a legitimate crossing.

Manufactured Emergency: The moment an Italian Coast Guard, Navy, or commercial vessel appears on the horizon, occupants frequently destroy the engine, discard their travel documents, or jump directly into the water.
The Legal Trap Snaps Shut: Under the international Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, SOLAS, and SAR conventions), any person in the water is legally defined as being in imminent distress. Italian authorities have no discretion: they are statutorily obligated to execute a rescue, bring the individuals aboard, and disembark them at a "place of safety"—which, by default of proximity and European legal doctrine, means an Italian port (like Lampedusa or Pozzallo).

Immediate Legal Shield: The instant their feet touch Italian soil, the individual utters the word "asylum." Under current ECHR and EU jurisprudence, they immediately gain protected legal status as an asylum seeker. They cannot be returned to the sea, summarily turned around, or expelled without an individual, multi-tier judicial review that routinely stretches on for months or years.
This is a textbook abuse of process: an intentionally manufactured distress scenario designed from the outset to trigger statutory rescue duties, bypass regular border controls, and activate protections never intended for simulated emergencies.

The Fiscal Burden: What This Costs the Italian Taxpayer
The financial cost of maintaining this open-ended procedural framework is massive, recurring, and almost entirely funded by public revenues:

The Macro Bill: Managing the reception network, maritime search-and-rescue sorties, identification centers, emergency healthcare, legal aid, and multi-stage administrative and judicial appeals costs Italy an estimated €3.5 billion to €4.5 billion annually.

Per-Person Cost: Factoring in maritime operations, daily reception allowances, food, housing, security, and court procedures, processing a single irregular arrival through multiple levels of asylum appeal costs the Italian state roughly €15,000 to €25,000 over the duration of the procedure.

The Cost Per Italian Worker: With roughly 23 million actively employed, tax-paying workers in Italy, this expenditure translates directly to an ongoing financial drain of approximately €150 to €200 per worker, every single year—siphoned away from strained public healthcare, underfunded schools, crumbling transport infrastructure, and domestic pensions.

The Unfair and Distorted Burden on Frontline States
The governing treaties are framed in neutral, universal language—imposing the exact same theoretical obligations on every European signatory. In practice, this creates an absurd and unworkable geographic imbalance:

Geography Dictates the Liability: Under the Dublin system and maritime law, the first country of entry must process, document, and house the arrival. A landlocked or geographically protected state (like Austria, the Czech Republic, or Finland) faces zero migrant boats pulling up on its beaches, yet enjoys full veto power over how the border states manage the crisis.

Asymmetric Sovereign Exposure: Italy possesses over 7,500 kilometers of coastline directly facing North African transit hubs. Enforcing a blind, generic legal standard on a frontline Mediterranean peninsula while giving protected northern capitals equal say in vetoing structural border reforms is inherently discriminatory and unsustainable.

The 4 Demands for Immediate Reform
To restore sanity, international and European law must be aligned with physical and fiscal reality:

A Statutory "Undue Hardship" and Absorption Ceiling
Fundamental rights conventions must define operational limits. A state cannot be legally forced into administrative or financial insolvency.
If arrivals surpass a state's defined processing threshold, emergency summary-rejection protocols and expedited third-country transfers must be recognized as lawful ex ante.

Abolishing Absolute Unanimity on Procedural Governance
Amend the Council of Europe framework to replace the 100% unanimity lock for immigration and border-enforcement protocols with a weighted supermajority.
Voting power must reflect a country’s economic contribution, population, and—critically—direct geographic exposure. The states enduring the largest frontline burden must have the highest proportional weight in triggering treaty updates.

"Pay for the Hardship" Rule
Any member state that exercises a veto or votes against common border-enforcement mechanisms or third-country processing treaties must be legally bound to directly compensate frontline states for the net fiscal and administrative costs of every unreturned arrival.

Legal Reclassification of Smuggling Exploitation
Establish clear legal distinctions between genuine asylum seekers and unauthorized entries facilitated by illicit logistical cartels, stripping automated asylum access from routes proven to exploit human trafficking networks and simulated distress.

Proposed Implementation Timeline

Phase 1 (Within 6 Months): Frontline coalition (Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, alongside sympathetic northern states) formally tables a draft Amending Protocol to the Council of Europe demanding an "Undue Hardship" exemption clause and weighted voting rules on migration articles.

Phase 2 (Within 12 Months): Full statutory rollout within the EU of qualified-majority directives permitting extraterritorial processing and third-country "return hubs" without individual domestic detention obligations.

Phase 3 (Within 24 Months): Full legal enforcement: mandatory fiscal compensation levied on dissenting states, alongside automated processing ceilings for frontline maritime zones.

Who to Contact / Demand Concrete Action
Hold elected representatives accountable for these structural issues rather than settling for temporary rhetoric.

If you are in Italy / the EU:

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs): Specifically, representatives sitting on the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE).
Look up your constituency MEPs: europarl.europa.eu/meps/
Ask them: "What specific draft amendments are you introducing to reform the ECHR unanimity requirement and codify an absorption ceiling into EU migration law?"

National Ministry of the Interior & Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Contact the Italian Ministry of the Interior (Ministero dell'Interno) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Farnesina).
Demand: Transparency on the net per-capita cost of unresolved deportation proceedings, and a diplomatic coalition demanding weighted voting in the Council of Europe.

Your Regional Parliamentary Deputies (Camera dei Deputati / Senato della Repubblica):
Target members of the Constitutional Affairs (Affari Costituzionali) and Foreign Affairs (Affari Esteri) committees.

Question: "What legislative steps are being taken to define domestic constitutional absorption limits against international treaty mandates?"
Tinkering with internal redistribution quotas and temporary detention facilities does not solve the structural problem. The underlying treaties must be reformed to reflect physical and mathematical realities.

One year ago, the European Commission ruled that Google had broken EU law by abusing its power over online advertising.

Since then, Google remains unpunished, raking in an estimated €288 million every single day from Europe. Its monopoly makes it harder for other businesses to compete, shapes what we see online, and means fewer choices for all of us.

Now it’s time for the EU to enforce its own ruling.

In my previous post, I asked whether Europe’s monarchies could be an obstacle to political unification. A lot of people answered that, in their opinion, the royal families themselves would not oppose unification.

Maybe I didn't explain myself clearly enough, because that's not quite what I meant.

I've always assumed that during my lifetime Europe might eventually become a single federal country, with one European government and the current countries becoming constituent states or regions. Maybe that's simply never going to happen.

But suppose it did. Suppose we had one country, one federal government and one common European citizenship, while the current countries remained constituent states.

Would citizens of republics like France, Germany or Italy really accept that some constituent states continued to have monarchies and hereditary, taxpayer-funded institutions?

Because to me there's something fundamentally strange about creating one political community based on equal citizenship and popular sovereignty, while simultaneously saying that some citizens are equal to everyone else except that a particular family is constitutionally special because they were born into it.

So that's what I meant by my original question. Would Europeans actually want that kind of country, or have I simply assumed for years that European political integration was heading somewhere that most Europeans don't actually want?

Interview with Marijn Markus, data scientist and vocal commentator (117k followers on LinkedIn) on Russian hybrid warfare, the war in Ukraine, the need for european soverignty and vocal activist for helping Ukraine and defending Europe. Fresh from his fourth trip to Ukraine, Marijn explains how the country has become the laboratory of modern warfare: autonomous drones and interceptors evolving in weeks; timescales that European militaries struggle to match. But the war is not contained to Ukraine alone: We discuss Russia’s hybrid attacks on Europe, the elections in Germany on Sunday that will probably see the AfD win in Sachsen-Anhalt, the drone threat, AI-generated propaganda and bot networks, foreign interference in European politics, Europe’s dependence on the United States, and what genuine European strategic sovereignty would require.

Hi, Lucia from EUobserver here 👋 Sharing our own reporting, but this immediately made me think of this community.

Spain wants Frontex to expand its presence in Ceuta and make the deployment permanent. The Commission, however, says there are still important questions about what that role should actually look like.

It raises a bigger question: if Ceuta is part of the EU’s external border, should protecting it really remain primarily Spain’s responsibility?

Could cases like this be an argument for turning Frontex into a genuinely European border force?

Seems like Trump will push Europe to finally stop buying US weapons and ramp up our own productions, something that we should've done years ago.

He remains the most effective EU Federalist.

The economic classifications of the factions in the EU-Parliament are simplified. Most of these factions also have differing views within their own ranks. One example would be the social-liberal wing of Renew, whose economic policies are more similar to those of Volt.

Since Volt is central to European federalism, I have listed the party separately, despite it not actually being a separate faction within the EU-Parliament.

Personal Opinion: European eonomic independence requires innovation and competitiveness. At the same time maintaining a welfare state is central to preserving a high quality of life.

Europe (throughout its history) has implemented systems (and still uses them) that can achieve these goals: the social market economy and social liberalism. Systems that are undoubtedly responsible for Europes high quality of life and our (still good) economic standing. Yes, these systems are far from perfect but compared to socialism and laissez-faire capitalism they offer a functioning framework for future reform.

Edit: grammer

Genuine question for Europeans: if the long-term goal is some kind of political union comparable to the United States, how much do you think having multiple monarchies and separate heads of state makes that harder?

Countries like the UK, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway still have their own royal institutions, alongside separate governments, political systems, and national identities.

Is a more politically unified Europe still considered a realistic long-term goal, or has the idea effectively shifted toward simply having economic/political cooperation between sovereign states?

And if deeper political integration is still the goal, how would you eventually reconcile all these separate monarchies and national institutions with something resembling a federal European state?

The Hungarian government will only be able to approve the European Union’s new seven-year budget if it serves the interests of Hungarian people and businesses, Prime Minister Péter Magyar told European Council President António Costa during a meeting in Budapest on Wednesday.

In a Facebook post following the meeting, Magyar said he had also told Costa that Hungary expected an early solution to the issue of the EUR 1 million-a-day fine imposed under the previous Hungarian government to be suspended.

Continue reading at https://dailynewshungary.com/magyar-meets-costa-eu-7-year-budget/ | DailyNewsHungary

2026/09/02

In the last 16 years I have become used to seeing Hungary in international news. After Orbán’s fall in April it has become a much rarer event. Something that millions of Hungarians and tens of millions of Europeans waited increasingly restlessly in the past years.

Last week however a small piece of news came out from Budapest. On Tuesday, the government published its policy guidelines where it calls Russia a treat to Europe, Hungary, and the world order, condemns its military aggression, and supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The shift is not surprising, but what happened just a day before is more interesting. One of the Hungarian Air Force’s fully loaded Gripen fighter jet crashed during an exercise. Then on the same week a 24-year-old drunk man stole a Cessna, and began flying towards Paks, where the country’s nuclear power plant is located. The Air Force had to call up its (remaining) Gripens to go after him, who then landed on a field and attempted to steal a car.

As of today, the first incident was deemed an accident, while the second as a lone drunk person’s mischiefs (perhaps a gamer who just couldn’t wait three more months for GTA VI). It might very well be the truth, but I couldn’t help but wonder, can there be something more to it?

Strangely similar cases across Europe

On the 13th of August a munitions' factory blew up near Rome. It was producing different types of ammunitions, including artillery shells for Ukraine. The official statement claimed it was an accident.

Nine days earlier, Leipzig Airport. A drone containing explosives was discovered near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane used to transport military supplies. According to the investigation, it was supposed to blow up the aircraft, but failed to detonate. About 20 minutes after the discovery of the explosives, a second drone collided with a DHL cargo plane. Days later, a third drone was found in a field close to the airport.

Friedrich Merz’s government took its time, but finally decided to publicly blame Russia for these attacks on the 1st of September. On the same day a drone was found in Romania, drones entered Estonian airspace alerting NATO jets, and in Germany homemade rockets targeted a major power plant.

These things happening in Europe are not new, but their frequency and severity seems to suggest an ongoing escalation. Russian drones and missiles are now repeatedly flying into Romania and Poland. In Romania even an apartment building was hit not long ago. 

A list of some of the gravest recent incidents:

• April 2025, Norway: cyberattack on a dam. Norwegian intelligence attributed it to pro-Russian hackers.
• April 2025, France: cyber campaign against French public and private organisations. Paris formally attributed it to GRU (Russian Military Intelligence).
• Spring 2025, Sweden: attack on a thermal power plant. Swedish government later linked it to a pro-Russian group.
• August 2025, Poland: attempted cyberattack on a major undisclosed city's water supply. The attacker has not been publicly identified.
• September 2025, Poland: More than 20 Russian military drones entered Polish airspace.
• September 2025, Estonia: three Russian military aircraft violated Estonian airspace.
• September - October 2025, multiple European countries: large wave of mysterious drones around airports and military sites. Suspected Russian hybrid activity.
• November 2025, Poland: attempted derailment of a train with nearly 500 passengers. The Polish government claims the perpetrators worked for Russian intelligence.
• December 2025, Poland: major attack on electricity infrastructure. Warsaw attributed it to Russian-linked actors; ESET linked it to GRU.
• August 2026, Norway: major pro-Russian DDoS attack on government digital services. A pro-Russian group claimed responsibility.

These are just some of the most serious actions that are publicly known. European security services and governments likely have many more incidents that didn’t (yet) become public.

What is Russia’s strategy?

While not all similar instances are necessarily Russian sabotage, they fit perfectly into Moscow’s strategy of waging a deniable “hybrid war” against Europe to sow discord and pressure governments to stop aiding Ukraine.

In 2024, American voters gave an enormous gift to Vladimir Putin and inflicted a massive blow on European security. Donald Trump not only stopped support for Kyiv but began pressuring it to surrender to Moscow’s demands, then went on to weaken NATO’s Article 5 to the point where each passing day fewer people believe that the US is willing to step in if Russia attacked one of its members.

Europe had no other choice but to quickly took over all military and economic support. It helped Kyiv absorb and withstand every pressure from Washington, while Ukraine still managing to halt Russia’s advances on the frontline.

With US backing successfully removed and still not being able to show results, Putin have concluded that the Europeans are the only ones standing between him and victory, and once they are also neutralized, Ukraine will have no choice but to surrender.

The aim of these attacks is to knock Europe out of its supporting role. They meant to stir panic, cause fear, divide publics and create an atmosphere of vulnerability which undermines trust in governments. Trust that they are capable of protecting their country, which gives ammunition to radical parties opposing Ukrainian support.

The coming escalation

Unfortunately I suspect that these actions will continue to intensify to the point where they might lead to a mass-casualty event. Something that will be deniable, and Russia might try to blame it on Ukraine, or at least create enough confusion that no coordinated response can be politically possible. If we add the growing concerns that Putin is preparing for another mobilization, it paints a grim picture.

Despite the frontline itself being largely stalled, Moscow is not forced to conduct a new mobilization. The current scheme of paying people to sign up is still sufficient to replenish losses, while the Kremlin can still hope that Ukraine will crumble this coming winter. The country’s infrastructure is in a much worse situation than the previous year, and lacking of meaningful air defence, it is quite likely to face a dark long cold winter with lots of hardships and a potential drastic slowing of economic and production output.

Putin, so far, has been avoiding another mobilization at all cost, fearing societal backlash. And yet, it seems like this autumn he will indeed go for it, even without being forced to. Thus, there is a possibility that his goal might go further than just to replenish losses. It could be the opening of a new front somewhere in Ukraine, or perhaps to use them for a provocation in the Baltic states, or even a limited incursion.

He might conclude that this is the perfect opportunity with a friendly President in Washington, and the US being busy with the midterm elections turning inwards, with a potential added inertia if Trump ends up contesting or straight up cheating the results. All in all, he can hope for a United States unwilling to meaningfully deal with foreign policy issues, and especially not ones considering a Europe they increasingly see with contempt and hostility.

But Putin might be heading towards his most fatal miscalculation, and the beginning of his demise. Open military pressure on Europe would produce the exact opposite effect.

He seemingly locked himself into an escalation spiral he is not willing to abandon. If he faces resistance or stagnation in one place, he tends to put pressure on another where he senses weakness. He is risking an escalation that Europe can no longer afford to ignore, and might push the continent into an active war.

I made the case multiple times before that this would cause the military and the geopolitical awakening of the EU, and all but guarantee that Russia would lose the war in Ukraine.

Conclusion

One of Putin’s great weaknesses is his lack of strategic patience. He could have coerced Kyiv to stay in Moscow’s orbit if he didn’t start the war in 2014. He still had a much better shot at undermining Europe and the West if he hadn’t invaded Ukraine in 2022. The far-right was already on the rise, and very few viewed Russia as a threat.

Instead, he created an unbreakable and extremely hostile Ukraine with the largest, most advanced, and most capable military on the continent, and a Europe that is rearming on a scale that seemed unimaginable just a few years ago. No matter how the war ends, Ukrainian hostility and European rearmament cannot be reversed.

Similarly, even today, he could still try building a more advantageous geopolitical position for Russia if he decided to pause the war, normalize relations with the West, and rebuild his military while undermining European democracies, unity, and support for Ukraine. He could wait for more and more countries to be overtaken by Trump and Orbán-like figures.

After Anchorage, he proved again that he is incapable of this sort of patient long-term strategic planning. He wants it all, and wants to get it by brute force that continues on backfiring for Russia on the long term.

It remains to be seen if he will finally take a misstep that will push him towards the grave. I am not convinced that he made that decision yet, but from what I can perceive, he is thinking about it. Europeans today are not psychologically ready for war. But Putin might force them into becoming ready.

The good news

With Germany openly blaming Russia for the attempted terror attacks and European leaders showing firm solidarity, the continent has begun to prepare for this eventuality. This is a necessary first step. It demonstrates the resolve needed to deter Moscow.

But as we enter a new much more dangerous phase of the war, we still have a lot to do.